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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE RELIGION
CLAUSES:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR GREENAWALT
Robert P. George
At the heart of Professor Greenawalt's understanding of the religion clauses is the idea that individuals and minorities need, and are
entitled to, the protection of courts exercising fairly broad discretion
to invalidate, or exempt members of minority faiths from, laws enacted by majorities that are hostile or, at least, insensitive to their legitimate interests. This idea is widely shared in the culture and, especially, in the legal academy, where it enjoys the status of
something like an orthodoxy. I do not suggest that it is a foolish or
dishonorable idea. I have certainly felt its attraction myself.
Indeed, it is easy to think of instances in American history when
courts have come to the aid of oppressed or exploited individuals or
members of minority groups. It is, however, also easy-all too
easy-to recall cases in which courts have come to the aid of their
oppressors or exploiters--cases in which the institutions of democratic governance at the state and federal level were effectively disabled by judges from preventing or rectifying injustices. Our nation's experience with judicial review confirms the adage, "the power
to do good is the power to do evil." Yes, thankfully, there was a
Brown v. Board of Education;' but there was, alas, also a DredScott
v. Sandford.2 Yes, there was a Pierce v. Society of Sisters3 and a
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette;4 but there was
also a Lochner v. New York 5 and an Adkins v. Children'sHospital.6
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
3. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

4. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

6. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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In short, the historical record is mixed. And then consider the case of
Roe v. Wade. In striking down laws prohibiting abortion, did the
Supreme Court advance the cause of women's freedom? Or did it
expose their innocent unborn offspring to virtually unrestricted lethal
violence? It would seem entirely to depend on one's moral view of
the status of human beings in the embryonic and fetal stages of their
development. 8 While judges certainly are entitled to have views on
this issue, it is unclear why their views should matter more than those
of other conscientious citizens.
The idea of courts exercising more or less free-wheeling judicial
review as a check on legislative oppression both overestimates judicial wisdom and virtue and underestimates the capacity of the people
and their elected representatives to act on the basis of principle,
rather than prejudice or self-interest.9 No idea in contemporary constitutional theory is more mischievous, in my view, than Ronald
Dworkin's juxtaposition of courts, as "forums of principle" concerned with the protection of rights, with legislatures, as forums of
policy charged to advance the general welfare-conceived in some
utilitarian or other aggregative fashion-subject to the enforcement
by judges of rights as trumps against "general utility," "aggregate
collective good," or some such concept.' 0 This idea teaches judges
truly to think of themselves as "princes "-indeed, "philosopher
kings"--and teaches the people as a whole that democracy is merely
about the clash of interests, rather than deliberation about justice and
the common good." It promotes as virtues the very vices to which
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. Compare Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Propositionthat
"Life Begins at Conception," 43 STAN. L. REV. 599 (1991), with Robert P.

George, Public Reason and PoliticalConflict: Abortion and Homosexuality,
106 YALE L. J. 2475, 2486-595 (1997), and Robert P. George, Law, Democracy, andMoral Disagreement, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1388, 1394-400 (1997).
9. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT

(1996); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (forthcoming).
10. See RONALD DWORKIN, The Forum of Principle, in A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE 33 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 91, 191
(1977). For a sustained critique of Dworkin's argument, see ROBERT P.
GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 83
(1993).
11. On the "deliberative" conception of democracy, see AMY GUTMANN &
DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT: WHY MORAL
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judicial and legislative officers, respectively, are most prone. Courts
are, to be sure, or should be, forums of legal principle; but legislatures are,
or should be, forums of moral principle for the making of
2
laws.'
To be sure, people often disagree about matters of moral principle. So, the political system must include a procedure for resolving
such disputes. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that a procedure
which reserves high matters of moral
principle to courts is more
13
decisions.
correct
generate
to
likely
Moreover, I think it is time to acknowledge candidly that the
reservation of such matters to the judiciary effectively vests vast
power in the hands of an elite-indeed, an elite very likely to be responsive to elite interests and opinion when they are in conflict with
popular opinion, as they often are today. For example, if one polls
the faculty of Princeton University on morally-charged political issues such as whether to abolish the death penalty or institute "samesex marriage," and then polls the first 700 people listed in the Trenton phone directory, one will almost certainly get very different results. If such issues are to be freely resolved by the judiciary in the
absence of clear constitutional warrant, can there be any doubt about
which side benefits? It is not that judges will come down on the
more liberal side every time in what Justice Scalia labeled the "Kulturkampf" in a famous dissent. 14 But it is more than likely that
where judges rob one side or the other of a victory at the polls, they
will rob the morally more conservative side.
As applied to religion, I think we have to take seriously the cultural clash between religious and secularist world views. The latter,
which is plainly dominant in the elite sector of the culture, obtains
benefits in presenting itself as a kind of "neutrality," rather than as
an ideology or world view that competes with others. If courts are to
enforce a doctrine of neutrality, they must, in fairness, avoid treating
CONFLICT CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN POLITICS, AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

ABOUT IT (1996).
12. Cass Sunstein puts the point well: "In American government and in all
well-functioning constitutional democracies, the real forum of high principle is
politics, not the judiciary-and the most fundamental principles are developed
democratically, not in courtrooms." SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 7.

13. See WALDRON, supra note 9.
14. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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secularism as if it were neutral. They must, in other words, enforce
neutrality as between secularism and religion. Even if judges understood and were willing to do that, it would be difficult in many cases
to know what such neutrality requires, or even whether it is possible.
Where it is not possible, society faces a choice between secularist
and religious values.
Now, in my decidedly non-fideistic Catholic view of things,
such a choice need not be "unreasoned." Whether the issue is human
cloning, assisted suicide, parental rights, or whether to remove "under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance, or "in God we trust" from
the coins, I am prepared to engage in the argument with my secularist
fellow citizens. Let the matter finally be resolved, however, by the
institutions of self-government-what Sunstein calls "the real forum
of principle"'15 in a democratic republic-not, in the absence of constitutional warrant, by the courts.

15. SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 60.

